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Abstract
We present an empirically supported theoretical and methodological framework for quantifying the
system-level properties of person-plus-tool interactions in order to answer the question: “Are person-
plus-tool-systems extended cognitive systems?” Nineteen participants provided perceptual judgments
regarding their ability to pass through apertures of various widths while using visual information, blind-
folded wielding a rod, or blindfolded wielding an Enactive Torch—a vibrotactile sensory-substitution
device for detecting distance. Monofractal, multifractal, and recurrence quantification analyses were
conducted to assess features of person-plus-tool movement dynamics. Trials where people utilized the
rod or Enactive Torch demonstrated stable “self-similarity,” or indices of healthy and adaptive single
systems, regardless of aperture width, trial order, features of the participants’ judgments, and partici-
pant characteristics. Enactive Torch trials exhibited a somewhat greater range of dynamic fluctuations
than the rod trials, as well as less movement recurrence, suggesting that the Enactive Torch allowed for
more exploratory movements. Findings provide support for the notion that person-plus-tool systems
can be classified as extended cognitive systems and a framework for quantifying system-level proper-
ties of these systems. Implications concerning future research on extended cognition are discussed.
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1. Introduction
Two commitments are commonly accepted as central to cognitive science: First, cogni-
tion is defined in terms of computations and representations. Second, cognition is localized
in brains (e.g., Von Eckardt, 1995; Thagard, 2020). With that being said, alternative research
programs that challenge one or both of these commitments have been fruitfully practiced con-
temporaneously. In regard to the first, it has been argued that “cognition” is not best under-
stood in terms of either computations or representations but instead in terms of dynamical
systems theory (e.g., van Gelder, 1998). In regard to the second, instead of being localized
in brains, it has been argued that cognition is embodied in both the nervous system and non-
neural morphology (e.g., Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991/2016); distributed across brains,
bodies, and features of the environment (e.g., Hutchins, 1995); and/or situated in the current
biological and environmental context (e.g., Robbins & Aydede, 2009).
In this vein, cognition is extended when, during a cognitive task (e.g., decision making,
goal-directed behavior, etc.), the cognitive system incorporates features of the world whose
spatial locations are beyond what is typically understood to be the boundaries of an organism,
such as scales, shell, or skin (Favela & Chemero, 2016). From this approach, cognition is not
just a neuronal phenomenon but can involve features of the body (e.g., cardiovascular system
and limbs) and the world (e.g., other organisms and nonbiological tools like smartphones and
wheelchairs; for review of additional examples, see Clark, 2008; Smart, 2017; Wagman &
Chemero, 2014). This understanding of cognition falls along a spectrum. At the weaker end
is the view that nonneuronal elements play significant causal roles in cognitive processes.
In this way, cognition remains primarily neuronal but has strong causal relationships (e.g.,
coupling) with, for example, a chalkboard, pencil and notebook, or smartphone (Clark, 2008).
At the stronger end of the spectrum is the view that nonneuronal elements play constitutive
roles in cognitive processes. In this way, some cognitive processes are made of nonneuronal
elements, for example, the information in a smartphone’s hard drive could be a part of the
user’s overall memory system in a manner that is functionally equivalent to the information
in their brain.
It is worth noting that there is disagreement as to whether or not particular cases count as
extended cognition or if they are instead cases of distributed, embodied, or situated cognition
(cf. Amon & Favela, 2019; Robbins & Aydede, 2009). On the one hand, these distinctions
are verbal disputes that hinge on disagreements about the definitions of concepts.1Although
we acknowledge that such definitional distinctions may have a significant impact on certain
projects, our present aim is not to provide thorough arguments for the necessary and sufficient
conditions of instances of extended cognition. On the other hand, such disagreements are
indicative of a major weakness undermining the ability to make progress on these issues.
Specifically, most debates concerning whether something is a case of extended cognition
hinge on arguments motivated by appeal to intuitions and thought experiments (e.g., Adams
& Aizawa, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998). With few exceptions, do such arguments appeal to
experimental data to support their claims (for review, see Wagman & Chemero, 2014)? With
that said, even the literature that does appeal to experimentation is limited in that it attempts
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to leverage data that did not test hypotheses explicitly about extended cognition per se (e.g.,
Wagman & Hajnal, 2016; for the rare exception, see Dotov, Nie, & Chemero, 2010).2
The current work contributes to the empirical literature on extended cognition by present-
ing results from an experiment that centered on a research question explicitly about extended
cognition: “Are person-plus-tool-systems extended cognitive systems?” We approached this
question by analyzing the movement dynamics of participants engaged with tools during a
task-centered on affordance judgments. Affordances are perceivable opportunities for behav-
ior (Gibson, 1979/1986). The affordance “graspable,” for example, is perceived when a mon-
key sees a piece of fruit it can hold in its hand; if a piece of fruit is too large, then it would
not afford grasping. Affordance-based tasks provide an experimental methodology for eval-
uating various perceptual modalities (e.g., audition) and conditions (e.g., stepping on stairs
of varying height; e.g., Warren, 1984). Whereas it is common for experimental psychology
experiments to evaluate participants’ task performance in terms of absolute units of mea-
surement (e.g., Euclidean distance), experiments centered on affordances do so in terms of
action-scaled or body-scaled metrics. In an affordance-based task, a participant’s performance
is assessed in terms of action-scaled units, or a metric based on their action capabilities, such
as how high they can step. Performance can also be evaluated in body-scaled units, or a
metric based on their body’s measurements, such as their leg length. Employing these met-
rics allows an experimenter to contextualize task performance relative to participants’ action
capabilities and body measurements. As such, the question for an affordance-based task is
not, “Can participants step on a stair height of X centimeters,” but rather “What action-scaled
and body-scaled metrics differentiate stairs that are step-on-able from not-step-on-able?” For
example, the critical point exists at which an aperture affords passing through or not based
on a participant’s shoulder width. This critical point is described in terms of an A/S ratio,
or aperture-to-shoulder ratio (Warren & Whang, 1987). Thus, a well-functioning perceptual
system is sensitive to its own action- and body-scaled properties while perceiving what is
afforded and what is not. A vast number of experiments have been conducted on the percep-
tion of affordances via biological senses, such as audition and vision (for review, see Turvey,
2019). There have also been a number of affordance-based experiments involving nonbiolog-
ical tools, such as manually wielding a wooden rod to judge the crossability of gaps (Burton,
1992) and a head-mounted wooden dowel to judge a surface’s standability (Wagman & Haj-
nal, 2016). Such examples demonstrate that affordances and their means of assessment (e.g.,
action-scaled units) provide a rich basis for assessing perceptual capabilities via biological
and nonbiological means in a wide range of experimental conditions.
Here, participants utilized vision or haptic sensory-substitution devices (SSDs) to support
perceptual judgments of affordances involving the task of passing through apertures (cf. de
Paz, Travieso, Ibáñez-Gijón, Bravo, Lobo, & Jacobs, 2019). Participants made perceptual
judgments about whether they could walk through apertures of various widths either using
unrestricted vision or blindfolded while wielding one of two haptic SSDs: a wooden rod
or the Enactive Torch (ET; Froese, McGann, Bigge, Spiers, & Seth, 2012), a device that
provides its user with distance information in the form of vibrotactile stimulation to the
wrist.3 Movements were analyzed via dynamical systems theory methods in order to assess
for the presence or absence of self-similar dynamic structures. An example of self-similarity
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is fractal geometry (Mandelbrot, 1977/1983) or patterns that exhibit the same structure at var-
ious spatial or temporal scales. Abstract fractals—for example, Cantor set, Koch snowflakes,
and Mandelbrot set—exhibit perfect self-similarity; that is, the shape exhibited at one spatial
scale is exactly repeated at other scales. Fractal patterns in nature—for example, broccoli,
coastlines, and lung bronchial tubes—are not perfectly self-similar but exhibit statistical
self-similarity; that is, elements of a phenomenon are repeated at various scales.
One reason self-similarity that has become a topic of interest for cognitive scientists is the
fact that such patterns seem to be associated with a variety of cognitive phenomena. Self-
similarity is exhibited by, for example, the spatial organization of physiology associated with
cognition (e.g., neuronal dendritic branching; Di Ieva, 2016) and, especially, the temporal
activity of such physiology (e.g., Rubinov, Sporns, Thivierge, & Breakspear, 2011), as well as
cognitive behavior itself (e.g., Holden, Van Orden, & Turvey, 2009). Another reason for the
interest in self-similarity is that such structures are associated with healthy systems (Masso-
brio, de Arcangelis, Pasquale, Jensen, & Plenz, 2015). “Healthy” has various meanings here,
such as efficient and maximum information processing (Beggs, 2019), organismic home-
ostasis (Hausdorff, Peng, Ladin, Wei, & Goldberger, 1995; Peng et al., 1995), and system
adaptability (Torre, Vergotte, Viel, Perrey, & Dupeyron, 2019) and integrity (Goldberger et al.,
2002). Self-similarity is a common feature of both natural and artificial systems (e.g., car-
diovascular system, central nervous system, protein-protein interaction networks, social net-
works, and World Wide Web; Di Ieva, 2016; Gallos, Song, & Makse, 2007; Goldberger et al.,
2002; Hausdorff et al., 1995; Peng et al., 1995). Additionally, fractals are widely implicated
as a diagnostic tool, where reductions in the fractal structure are associated with diseases—for
example, deterioration of the spatial fractal structure of white matter is associated with neu-
rodegenerative disease (Zhang & Yue, 2016) and temporal fractal structure of heartbeats as
an indicator of heart disease (Peng et al., 1995). Due to this fact, assessing the degree of self-
similarity that a phenomenon exhibits—spatial or temporal—can serve part of the case that
the phenomenon is a single, well-functioning system. Accordingly, a collection of elements
can be understood as a single “system” if it exhibits self-similarity (e.g., fractals, power laws,
scale invariance, etc.) via its organization and/or dynamics, which indicates that it is max-
imizing information processing, and maintains homeostasis while being balanced between
adaptability and stability. Following from this line of thought, well-functioning perceptual
systems ought to exhibit various forms of self-similar dynamics while accurately perceiving,
such as while perceiving affordances (e.g., Hajnal, Clark, Doyon, & Kelty-Stephen, 2018).
Note that we do not claim that one form of self-similarity (e.g., monofractal) will alone
demonstrate that a collection of elements is a single system. We build our research question
on the following commitments: First, there is a compelling empirical literature demonstrating
that single systems exhibit self-similarity in their dynamics (e.g., heartbeats; see references
above). Second, there is also compelling empirical literature demonstrating that single
systems can exhibit self-similarity in their spatial organizational structures (e.g., neuronal
networks; see references above). Third, self-similarity has been demonstrated by properly
functioning single systems, where “properly” refers to healthy, highly efficient information
processing, and/or accurate task completion. Fourth, various forms of self-similarity are
increasingly being implicated as a fundamental feature of a range of cognitive processes (for
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a small sample see Amazeen, 2018; Amon, Pavlov, & Holden, 2018; Chemero, 2009; Favela,
2020; Gilden, 2001; Gilden, Thornton, & Mallon, 1995; King, 1991; Van Orden, Holden, &
Turvey, 2005; Van Orden, Hollis, & Wallot, 2012; Ward, 2002; Werner, 2010).
Addressing our overarching research question—“Are person-plus-tool-systems extended
cognitive systems?”—required us to address the following related questions: First, are self-
similar dynamics exhibited by movements during affordance judgments of aperture pass-
through-ability? Second, if self-similar dynamics occur during the task, how do they compare
across the three modalities (i.e., judgments made with vision, rod, or Enactive Torch)? Third,
if self-similar dynamics do occur to a similar degree across the three modalities, two of which
involve nonbiological tools outside the body periphery, does that mean participants become
person-plus-tool systems in order to perform the task? We hypothesized that participants’ arm
movements while wielding haptic tools during the affordance-judgment task would exhibit
self-similar dynamics. Participants’ eye movements were not recorded. However, we appeal
to previous research demonstrating that eye movement structure—by nature of the visual
system—exhibits self-similar dynamics during visual-search tasks (e.g., Aks, Zelinsky, &
Sprott, 2002; Stephen & Anastas, 2011).
This work expands on previous research by the authors, including the finding by Favela
and colleagues (Favela, Riley, Shockley, & Chemero, 2018) that participants’ perception of
the boundary between aperture widths that were pass-through-able versus non-pass-through-
able were statistically equivalent across sensory modalities. In other words, participants made
judgments regarding the affordance “pass-through-able” that were of equivalent accuracy
whether they perceived with vision, haptically via a rod, or haptically via the Enactive Torch.
Moreover, when grouped together, the two haptic tools were statistically more accurate than
vision. Despite performing better with the haptic tools, participants were less confident in
their judgments using the rod and Enactive Torch as compared to vision. The results motivate
the need to assess SSD in the context of functional behaviors, for example, to support the
development of prosthetics and tools for the visually impaired (Favela et al., 2018; Travieso,
Gomez-Jordana, Diaz, Lobo, & Jacobs, 2015). Findings from the perceptual judgments pro-
vide preliminary support for extended cognition, they do not alone provide direct support. In
this paper, we bolster the case for extended cognition by expanding on the perceptual judg-
ment findings by way of analyses focused on movement dynamics during tool use. We do so
by highlighting a quantitative framework for assessing the degree of functional information
exchange between humans and tools, where high-functioning single systems are defined by
self-similar dynamics. Moreover, we aim to strengthen our case by assessing multiple forms
of self-similar dynamics: monofractal, multifractal, and recurrence.
2. Method
Here, we summarize the experiment that provided the currently analyzed move-
ment data (for full details, see Favela et al., 2018). Undergraduate students (27; 19
women and eight men) from a large university in the Midwestern United States par-
ticipated. They reported no experience with handheld mobility assistance devices (e.g.,
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Fig 1. Enactive Torch and motion-capture setup. Note. The Enactive Torch version 5 was utilized in the experiment
(a). The infrared range sensors are at the front (pointing right in image). The device connects via a cord to a
vibrational motor attached by a Velcro strap to the user’s wrist. The Enactive Torch was designed by Tom Froese
and Adam Spiers (2007). Body kinematics were tracked with a motion capturing system (Optotrak; Northern
Digital, Inc.). Participants’ movements were tracked via a “marker” attached to the top of the hand that wielded
the rod and Enactive Torch (b).
crutches) or a history of movement or perception disorders. Informed consent was
provided by participants after being presented with an overview of the experimental
procedure and the Institutional Review Board-approved (# 11041501E) study procedures
and consent document. During trials, participants were placed in front of an aperture that
consisted of a doorway with two sliding panels that could slide laterally to create aperture
widths ranging from 40 to 75 cm. Participants made affordance judgments of pass-through-
ability utilizing SSD in two of the three conditions: a cane-like wooden rod (length: 121.5
cm, diameter: 1.27 cm; weight: 113.4 g) and the Enactive Torch (length: 15.8 cm; width: 5.8
cm; height: 4.6 cm; weight: 350 g; Fig. 1). By moving the Enactive Torch (e.g., side to side,
up and down, etc.), the user obtains information about the layout of nearby surfaces. Distance
is detected with infrared range sensors and translated to haptic (vibrational) stimuli by a
motor embedded in the wrist strap worn by the user. The intensity of vibration is inversely
proportional to the distance of a surface, such that more intense vibrations are caused by near
surfaces. Participants wore earmuffs (3M PELTOR Sport Bull’s Eye 9) in all three conditions
and an additional blindfold in the two haptic conditions.
All participants stood with the heels of their feet 76 cm from the aperture and were told
they would remain at this same distance from the aperture for the entire experiment. Partici-
pants were presented each of the three modality conditions in blocks that were presented in
random order across participants: (a) vision, (b) blindfolded with a rod, and (c) blindfolded
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with Enactive Torch. Each condition block consisted of 16 aperture widths: eight widths at
5-cm increments between 40 and 75 cm randomly presented once and then randomly pre-
sented again. Participants were instructed to provide perceptual reports concerning their abil-
ity to pass through the aperture by responding “yes” or “no” with regard to whether they
could comfortably walk—that is, without rotating the shoulders or hitting the panels with
their arms—through the presented aperture on a given trial. Participants were asked to pro-
vide confidence ratings between 1 and 7 (1: “not confident in my judgment”; 7: “very confident
in my judgment”) of their “yes” or “no” responses. In the vision condition, participants were
asked to close their eyes between trials and to point the rod and Enactive Torch to the side
between trials in the haptic conditions while panels were moved to create the aperture width
for the next trial. Body kinematics were tracked with a motion-capturing system (Optotrak;
Northern Digital, Inc.) and data were collected via First Principles software. Participants had
a “marker” placed on the top of the hand they used to wield the rod and Enactive Torch, with
movements recorded at a frequency sample of 100 Hz.
3. Analyses
Next, we outline three complementary analytic approaches for understanding movement
dynamics during person-plus-tool interactions: detrended fluctuation analysis (DFA), multi-
fractal DFA (MFDFA), and auto-recurrence quantification analysis (aRQA). First, we utilized
DFA to examine the self-similar dynamics of movement during tool use in terms of the Hurst
exponent (H), a linear relation indicating the degree of self-similarity across scaling. Doing
so is central to the research question examining whether human-plus-tool interactions can be
qualified as single systems.
Because it was plausible for both Enactive Torch and rod trials to exhibit self-similar
dynamics, we examined more detailed information regarding differences in movement
between Enactive Torch and rod via MFDFA. In addition to providing the monofractal H
value (similar to DFA), MFDFA supplies a range of H values that indicate the degree to
which self-similarity varies across the time series and based on timescale. MFDFA has been
used to determine the relative health and functioning of a system, for example, age-related
decline in brain-related dynamics, effectively identifying heart disease, and muscle fatigue
(Ivanov et al., 1999; Makowiec et al., 2011; Suckling, Wink, Bernard, Barnes, & Bullmore,
2008; Wang, Ren, Li, & Wang, 2007). Self-similar dynamics (e.g., identified via DFA) are
widely implicated as marks of healthy systems. However, there is no hard-and-fast rule as to
whether low versus high variability in self-similarity is ideal (e.g., identified via MFDFA).
That is, both increased (Song, Lee, Kim, Lee, & Kim, 2005; Wang et al., 2007) and decreased
(Ivanov et al., 1999) variations in self-similar structure have been associated with negative
health and performance outcomes. One possibility is that the benefits associated with spe-
cific timescales of influence on signal structure are context-specific. For example, the dom-
inance of fast timescale fluctuations may be healthy in one system but either overwhelm or
be inconsequential for another system where slow timescales are key to performance (Van
Orden et al., 2012). Another possibility is that the benefits of greater or lesser variation in
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self-similarity differ based on the degree to which the spectrum overlaps with H in the range
of fractal scaling, where a narrowed spectra in the range of white noise (relatively random)
has negative effects on the system. Although more research is needed to examine differences
in functioning associated with high and low variability in self-similar structure, MFDFA has
been fruitfully applied in a variety of contexts and provides a more nuanced perspective of
self-similarity than DFA alone.
Last, we utilized aRQA to describe the degree to which novel versus repetitive movements
were generated during each trial with Enactive Torch and rod. Nonlinear dynamical systems
theory (and, relatedly, complex systems theory) highlights that well-functioning systems must
be both adaptable and stable—not too rigid or too random—such that these opposing forces
are balanced. Systems that exhibit a functional balance between order and disorder are called
“far from equilibrium,” which is considered a universal feature of healthy systems (Bosso-
maier & Green, 2007). The aRQA is a means for capturing this balance between repetition
(i.e., stability) versus novelty (i.e., adaptability) within a signal, where prior research high-
lights the tradeoff in higher repetition corresponding to greater degrees of functional coordi-
nation (e.g., Richardson & Dale, 2005) and lower repetition indicating the adaptive ability to
re-organize behavior to meet task demands (e.g., Amon, Vrzakova, & D’Mello, 2019). Thus,
we hypothesize that participants will exhibit a balance between repetitive and novel move-
ment patterns with both tools. Furthermore, it is expected that more coordinated, repetitive
movements will be produced with the rod, which is a type of tool people are more familiar
with, as opposed to the more novel Enactive Torch.
3.1. DFA
DFA was employed to assess for self-similarity in the body kinematic data recorded by
the motion-capturing system during trials with the two haptic SSDs. DFA detects statistical
self-similarity after removing local trends within specified windows of time in a dataset (Peng
et al., 1994). After this linear detrending, the remaining data represent fluctuations around a
global trend. For each window size, the log–log plot of the transformed frequency as a func-
tion of the transformed amplitude fluctuations reveals a linear relation indicating the degree
of self-similarity across scaling, given by the Hurst exponent (H; Fig. 2). Accordingly, DFA is
an appropriate method for assessing fractal structure (Delignieres et al., 2006; Holden, 2005).
For the present study, three types of dynamics are pertinent. H exponents near one
(H ≈ 1) indicate pink noise, also referred to as 1/f scaling or 1/f noise. Pink noise reveals
a signal’s fractal structure or self-similar temporal or spatial patterns across scales (Holden
et al., 2009; Kello, Beltz, Holden, & Van Orden, 2007). Pink noise contrasts with white noise,
which represents random or independent timesteps (H ≈ 0.5). H exponents close to 1.5 or
higher (H ≈ 1.5) represent brown noise, or Brownian motion, which describes patterns of
variability that exhibit a random walk pattern that has the appearance of local randomness
or independence but global structure (Gilden, 2001; Holden, 2005). Brownian noise often
describes movements of natural systems where it is not easy to predict a specific movement
trajectory, but the trajectory is always dependent on the system’s previous position.
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Fig 2. Detrended fluctuation analysis (DFA). Note: Example DFA procedure. (a) Linear detrending occurring at
powers of two: 64 samples (bottom), 128 samples (middle), 256 samples (top). The log–log plot of the remaining
trend for each window size along a slope or alpha (α). (b) The α value is transformed to obtain the Hurst (H)
value in order to reveal degrees of self-similarity in a signal. Example H values: H ≈ 0.5 indicates white noise
(random or unstructured signal), H ≈ 1 indicates pink noise (fractal or highly structured), and H ≈ 1.5 indicates
brown noise (Brownian motion or local randomness with long-term structure). (c) (Modified and reprinted with
permission from Rigoli et al. (2020). CC BY 4.0.).
Consistent with Ihlen (2012), our DFA procedure analyzed data in increments of integer
powers of two, such as 512, 1024, 2048, and so forth. In line with this criterion, a minimum
cutoff of 1024 data points was set. For trials where data had gaps shorter than 20 ms, a
MATLAB (MathWorks) function was used to interpolate those missing sections of the time
series using a polynomial fit. Trials were excluded if no data were collected for reasons such
as the marker being outside of the motion capturing range. After applying these criteria, data
from 19 of the original 27 participants remained viable for analysis.
DFA parameters were set in accordance with literature standards (e.g., Cannon, Percival,
Caccia, Raymond, & Bassingthwaighte, 1997; Eke, Herman, Kocsis, & Kozak, 2002; Ihlen,
2012), which the authors have utilized in prior research (e.g., Amon et al., 2018; Dotov et
al., 2010; Favela, Coey, Griff, & Richardson, 2016). The analysis was set to evaluate the first
1024 data points per time series after each trial began. Data integration was not needed as the
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data were already fractional Brownian motion and appropriate for DFA. We utilized a linear
detrend, 50% window overlap, minimum window size of 4, and maximum window size of
128 (i.e., 1024 data points/8 = 128). Researchers can opt to remove linear, polynomial, cubic,
and other trends from the data, where linear detrending is standard for time series with a
smaller minimum window size to avoid overfitting of the polynomial trend (Ihlen, 2012). In
addition to these parameters, MFDFA included the following parameters: q minimum = –5;
q maximum = 5; and q step = 2.
3.2. MFDFA
As stated above, a fractal displays the same structure at various spatial or temporal scales
or scale invariance. Traditional (mono)fractal analyses such as DFA are defined by a single
power-law exponent and assumes that such scale invariance is independent in time and space
(Ihlen, 2012). However, there can be spatial and temporal variations within a signal structure.
Just as means and standard deviations may vary within a time series and for events of different
magnitudes, it follows that fractal structure can also vary across the time series. Multifractal
analysis characterizes different scaling properties across a signal, capturing nonlinear cas-
cades with sporadic bursts of activity. In doing so, multifractal analysis indicates the relative
influence of different timescales in determining time series structure (Ihlen, 2012).
MFDFA accounts for nonlinear cascades by adding a q parameter to the DFA, which weighs
the influence of small and large fluctuations (i.e., root-mean-square; RMS). RMS of variation
around local trends is raised to the value of each q parameter. The more negative the q-value,
the more strongly influenced the segment is by small fluctuations; the more positive the q-
value, the more influenced the segments are by large fluctuations; qs of 0 are neutral to the
influence of relatively small or large fluctuations. The variation of H exponents based on
q provides an index of multifractality or the degree to which 1/f scaling varies across the
signal (Ihlen, 2012). Put simply, MFDFA generates numerous H values, with each H value
emphasizing different scales of interest. More extreme fluctuations or “bursts” of activity in
the time series are weighted using the q-value, which, in turn, influence the H exponent.
We utilized q-values ranging from –5 to 5 in increments of 2, in order to examine the
relative amplitude of different timescale fluctuations within the movement time series. In
doing so, we examine the singularity spectrum of the signal, or the range of H values that
define the signal across timescales, where a larger width corresponds to a greater deviation in
1/f scaling based on small and large fluctuations. We also examine the relative H minima and
maxima of the time series in order to examine the degree to which fast and slow timescales
influence the structure of the signal, respectively.
Notably, MFDFA produces the same H value derived from DFA, though researchers who
report MFDFA tend to focus on additional information derived from the analysis (esp. H
spectral width). As previously noted, the q parameter weights different scales of the time
series before calculating each subsequent H value. When the q-parameter is 0, it is neutral to
the influence of small or large RMS variability and derives a monofractal H value identical
to DFA. Thus, just as the H minimum (e.g., at q = –5), H maxima (e.g., at q = 5) and
their difference (H spectral width) are of interest when conducting MFDFA, the monofractal
H value at q = 0 remains of interest. It follows that monofractal and MFDFA analyses are
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not mutually exclusive, and we discuss H values at various q-value in the spectra to better
understand movement dynamics during the experiment.
For the current work, both DFA and MFDFA employed MATLAB (MathWorks) functions
utilized in prior research of cognitive systems (original code versions developed by Charles
Coey based on Ihlen, 2012). The data source was the x-axis (i.e., side-to-side or left-to-right)
motion of participants during each trial while they used either the rod or Enactive Torch to
inform judgments of aperture pass-through-ability.
Utilizing DFA in human behavior research is becoming more common (see references in
Section 3.1). Though there has been some application (e.g., Davis, Brooks, & Dixon, 2016;
West & Scafetta, 2005), the same is not true of MFDFA. Here, we expand on the literature
utilizing MFDFA in human behavior research by examining the relative scales of fluctuation
during person-plus-tool movement dynamics.
3.3. aRQA
Recurrence quantification analysis captures the temporal evolution of behavior by identi-
fying the degree to which a signal returns to previous states, providing an index of repeat
or “recurrent” values over time (Marwan, Romano, Thiel, & Kurths, 2007; Webber & Mar-
wan, 2015). Although there are different variations of RQA that capture alignment between
two signals (cross-RQA; Coco & Dale, 2014) or numerous signals (multidimensional-RQA;
Wallot, Roepstorff, & Mønster, 2016), auto-RQA (aRQA; Webber & Zbilut, 2005) measures
repetitiveness within one time series and is appropriate for characterizing movement trajecto-
ries of an individual wielding a rod or Enactive Torch. Though they are not typically utilized
in conjunction, analyses such as DFA and RQA are well-suited for application to many of the
same phenomena, especially if self-similarity is of interest. The reason is that, by definition,
fractals are recurrent: They are self-similar structures that repeat at different scales (Webber,
2012). aRQA supplements DFA and MFDFA by identifying the relative balance between rep-
etition versus novelty, where such a balance is foundational to healthy systems (see Section 3).
aRQA first produces a distance matrix that indicates the Euclidean distance between all
time points within a time series, where larger values indicate greater differences in values
between two time points. A radius is applied to the distance matrix, with distance values
less than the radius constituting a recurrent point (1) and distance values greater than the
radius constituting a non-recurrent point (0). This binarizes the recurrence matrix—a quali-
tative depiction of recurrence—such that recurrent points are highlighted in black. Although
a number of measures can be derived from the RQA matrices, here we focus on recurrence
rate, or the percentage of recurrent points within the matrix, excluding the diagonal line of
identity where the time series is recurrent with itself at lag 0.
RQA requires that a number of parameters be selected prior to analysis. First, phase-space
reconstruction is sometimes recommended in order to uncover the underlying dimensions
of a given signal (see Webber & Zbilut, 2005). However, uncovering dimensionalities of
the movement signals was not of primary interest to the present research, motivating us to
avoid an unnecessary transformation of the measured signal. In addition, we are not aware
of research that has tested the assumption that phase-space reconstruction methods are robust
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Table 1
Summary statistics of detrended fluctuation analysis (DFA) and multifractal DFA analyses
H H Spectral Width H Minima H Maxima
Condition M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Enactive Torch 1.27 (.09) 1.52 (.14) 0.87 (.11) 2.4 (.09)
Rod 1.29 (.08) 1.35 (.15) 0.94 (.09) 2.29 (.19)
in recovering true underlying dimensionalities of individual signals (e.g., creating delayed
copies of a heart rate variability signal accurately captures its subprocesses). Without phase
space reconstruction, RQA maintains its purpose of identifying points of recurrence within
the original time series, indicating whether two points in time are sufficiently similar to one
another to be counted as recurrent. For these reasons, we set the embedding dimension and
delay parameters to one. The radius is traditionally set to maintain an average recurrence
rate across signals that are relatively low, for example, between 2% and 5% (e.g., Coco &
Dale, 2014). This is necessary to avoid mischaracterizing very different values as being sim-
ilar to one another, as well as to avoid ceiling effects where a large radius might result in
some participants having almost all recurrent points. For the rod, we maintained an average
recurrence rate of 4.92 (SD = 1.39) and 4.70 for the Enactive Torch (SD = 1.75) using a
radius of .04. MATLAB (MathWorks) code from Wallot et al. (2016) was utilized to analyze
movement dynamics from each trial. Mixed-effects models were completed in R (R Core




Summary statistics for DFA and MFDFA based on condition are presented in Table 1. Each
participant was assigned an average score for each variable before summary statistics were
calculated across participants. Given that participants varied in the number of trials utilized in
the current analyses, examining averaged participant scores was necessary to avoid weighting
participants with a greater number of trials more than others.
DFA yielded H values indicative of 1/f scaling for movements of both the rod (M = 1.29,
SD = 0.079) and Enactive Torch (M = 1.27, SD = 0.09) during perceptual judgments. The
findings indicate that both rod and Enactive Torch wielding produced movement patterns
squarely between 1/f scaling (H = 1) and Brownian motion (H = 1.5), consistent with the
notion of finding self-similar fractal structure within movement data. Specifically, values in
this range (Holden, 2005, p. 298) are consistent with a particular type of movement data or
global trend referred to as anti-persistent Brownian motion, where successive increments in a
time series tend to have opposite signs (e.g., positive followed by negative change). The fact
that a self-similar structure is embedded within an anti-persistent trend is intuitive, in which
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anti-persistence reflects the back-and-forth motion participants tended to use when exploring
the aperture width with the rod or Enactive Torch.
4.2. Variation in 1/f scaling
A mixed-effects multiple linear regression model was utilized to examine the extent to
which DFA H values for each trial varied as a function of condition (rod or Enactive Torch),
trial number, pass-through-ability judgment, self-reported confidence in judgment, and aper-
ture width, with the participant as a random intercept. The number of trials available for
each participant was included as a covariate to control for differences between participants.
The results are shown in Table 2, Model 1. Findings indicate that while H values differed
significantly across participants based on the random intercept, all other predictors were non-
significant, p > .10. Put differently, H values were statistically equivalent regardless of the
instrument used or the aperture width. H was also relatively stable regardless of pass-through-
ability and confidence judgments. Notably, order effects were not present, indicating that
movement dynamics were similarly fractal throughout the trials.
We used a series of mixed-effects multiple linear regression models to examine the extent
to which multifractal dynamics—including spectral width, H minimum, and H maximum—
varied based on condition (rod or Enactive Torch), trial number, pass-through-ability judg-
ment, self-reported confidence in judgment, and aperture width, with the participant as a
random intercept and controlling for the number of trials available for each participant.
First, we found that MFDFA spectral width varied significantly based on condition (rod
or Enactive Torch), with Enactive Torch exhibiting a wider H spectrum (β = .08, p = .04).
In addition, greater aperture widths corresponded to wider H widths (β = .01, p < .001).
MFDFA H width did not significantly vary based on the trial number, degree of self-reported
judgment confidence, or perceived pass-through-ability, p > .10. See Table 2, Model 2, for a
summary of results.
Second, we examined the extent to which H minimum varied as a function of the same
set of predictors as in the previous model (Table 2, Model 3). Findings indicated that condi-
tion (rod or Enactive Torch) was a significant predictor of the H minimum. Specifically, the
Enactive Torch was marginally associated with lower H minima, suggesting that participants
demonstrated somewhat higher amplitude movements at faster timescales, as compared with
the rod (β = –.05, p = .07).4 Figure 3 illustrates this concept qualitatively through compari-
son of example Enactive Torch (solid line) and rod (dash-dotted line) time series, where short
back-and-forth movements were made when participants could presumably sense the ends of
the aperture by quickly waving the Enactive Torch back-and-forth. Findings suggest that the
Enactive Torch condition was associated with more fine motor movements than the rod.5 H
minima were not significantly associated with the trial number, aperture width, perceived
pass-through-ability, judgment confidence, or the number of trials available for analysis,
p > .10.
Third, we examined the extent that the same set of predictors as in the previous two models
predicted MFDFA H maxima. The results are shown in Table 2, Model 4. We found that
higher H maxima were associated with larger aperture widths, indicating higher amplitude
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Table 2
Monofractal H value (Model 1), multifractal spectrum (Model 2), H minima (Model 3), and H maxima (Model 4)
based on condition, task features, and participant judgments
Dependent Variable:
Hurst (H) Spectral Width
β CI (95%) p β CI (95%) p
Condition (ET) –.03 (–0.08, 0.01) .13 .08 (0.005, 0.16) .04
Trial number –.001 (–0.003, 0.002) .58 –.002 (–0.01, 0.002) .26
Aperture width –.0002 (–0.003, 0.002) .90 .01 (0.004, 0.01) <.001
Judgment (yes) –.01 (–0.08, 0.05) .66 –.08 (–0.18, 0.03) .14
Judgment confidence –.01 (–0.02, 0.01) .37 –.01 (–0.03, 0.02) .65
Trials available .01 (–0.01, 0.03) .28 –.01 (–0.03, 0.01) .40
Random intercept: Participant 1.18 (0.79, 1.56) <.001 1.22 (0.73, 1.71) <.001
Observations 344 344
Akaike inf. crit. –8.81 332.43
Bayesian inf. crit. 25.75 367.00
Dependent Variable:
H Minima H Maxima
β CI (95%) p β CI (95%) p
Condition (ET) –.05 (–0.11, 0.004) .08 .03 (–0.03, 0.09) .33
Trial number .001 (–0.002, 0.005) .36 –.001 (–0.004, 0.002) .59
Aperture width –.0001 (–0.003, 0.003) .97 .01 (0.004, 0.01) <.001
Judgment (yes) –.01 (–0.09, 0.07) .85 –.07 (–0.16, 0.01) .09
Judgment confidence –.01 (–0.03, 0.01) .37 –.02 (–0.04, 0.004) .12
Trials available .01 (–0.01, 0.03) .48 –.003 (–0.01, 0.01) .53
Random intercept: participant .81 (0.31, 1.30) .002 2.11 (1.80, 2.42) <.001
Observations 344 344
Akaike inf. crit. 159.67 168.42
Bayesian inf. crit. 194.24 202.99
Note. Standardized estimates (β) and 95% confidence intervals (CI) for a mixed-effects multiple linear regres-
sion model examining monofractal H value, multifractal spectrum, H minima, and H maxima as a function of
aperture task features and participant judgments.
movements at slower timescales (β = .008, p < .001). In addition, positive pass-through-
ability judgments—when participants responded that an aperture was pass-through-able—
were marginally associated with lower H maxima (β = –.07, p = .09). MFDFA H maxima
did not significantly vary as a function of condition, trial number, or self-reported judgment
confidence, p > .10.
4.3. aRQA
A mixed-effects multiple linear regression model was utilized to examine the extent to
which recurrence rate of movement dynamics during each trial varied based on condition (rod
or Enactive Torch), trial number, pass-through-ability judgment, self-reported confidence in
L. H. Favela et al. / Cognitive Science 45 (2021) 15 of 27
Fig 3. Time series movement examples of Enactive Torch and rod. Note. Example Enactive Torch (solid line) and
rod (dash-dotted line) time-series movements. Back-and-forth movements are exhibited while wielding both tools
when participants could presumably sense the edges of the aperture opening. The zoomed-in portion provides
a qualitative depiction of lower H minima associated with the Enactive Torch, which suggests that participants
demonstrated somewhat higher amplitude movements at faster timescales as compared with the rod.
judgment, and aperture width, with the participant as a random intercept. The number of trials
available for each participant was included as a covariate to control for differences between
participants. The findings indicated that participants wielding the Enactive Torch exhibited
less recurrence and therefore explored more of the space as compared to when participants
wielded the rod (β = –.37, p = .02). Unlike with the DFA and MFDFA models, the trial
number was significantly associated with recurrence rate, such that there was greater recur-
rence during later trials (β = .03, p < .001). Marginal effects are also present, suggesting
narrower aperture widths may correspond to greater recurrence (β = –.02, p = .06). In addi-
tion, a marginally significant effect suggests that positive judgments of pass-through-ability
predicted higher recurrence rates (β = .38, p = .09). Recurrence rate was not significantly
related to participants’ judgment confidence or the number of trials available for analysis,
p > .10. See Table 3 for detailed results.
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Fig 4. Recurrence plot examples of arm movements while wielding Enactive Torch and rod. Note. Example Enac-
tive Torch (a) and rod (b) recurrence plots depicting the auto-recurrence quantification analysis results demon-
strating that participants wielding the Enactive Torch exhibited less recurrence and explored more space (a), while
participants wielding the rod exhibited more recurrence but explored less space (b).
Table 3
Movement recurrence based on condition, task features, and participant judgments
Dependent Variable:
Recurrence Rate
β CI (95%) p
Condition (ET) –.37 (–0.69, –0.05) .03
Trial number .03 (0.02, 0.05) < .001
Aperture width –.02 (–0.04, 0.001) .07
Judgment (Yes) .38 (–0.05, 0.82) .09
Judgment confidence .03 (–0.08, 0.13) .64
Trials available .03 (–0.02, 0.07) .22
Random intercept: participant 4.48 (3.02, 5.94) <.001
Observations 344
Log-likelihood –634.43
Akaike inf. crit. 1286.86
Bayesian inf. crit. 1321.43
Note. Standardized estimates (β) and confidence intervals (CI) for a mixed-effects multiple linear regression
model examining the relationship between recurrence rate and aperture task features and participant judgments.
4.4. Participant characteristics
Although not central to the present research questions, the previously presented models
revealed that fractal dynamics significantly varied across individual participants as indicated
by the random intercept. Thus, we conducted an a posteriori mixed-effects multiple linear
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Table 4
H value based on participant characteristics
Dependent Variable:
Recurrence Rate
β CI (95%) p
Aperture-to-shoulder ratio .57 (–1.00, 2.14) .48
Age .01 (–0.07, 0.09) .82
Gender (male) .20 (–0.22, 0.62) .36
Weight (lbs) –.01 (–0.01, 0.001) .08
Random intercept: participant 1.13 (–1.59, 3.84) .42
Observations 345
Log-likelihood 31.27
Akaike inf. crit. –48.54
Bayesian inf. crit. –21.63
Note. Standardized estimates (β) and confidence intervals (CI) for a mixed-effects multiple linear regression
model examining the relationship between monofractal H value and participant characteristics.
regression analysis to examine the extent to which individual characteristics of the partici-
pants predicted 1/f scaling. Specifically, we regressed H value on participants’ aperture-to-
shoulder width, age, gender, race, and weight. Although there was a marginally significant
effect indicating that higher weight corresponded to lower H values (β = −.01, p = .08),
participant characteristics identified during the experiment were overall non-significant in
predicting differences in 1/f scaling, p > .10. See Table 4 for full results.
5. Discussion
Utilizing methods from dynamical systems theory, we quantified participants’ dynamics to
test our hypothesis that arm movements would exhibit self-similar dynamics while wielding
two haptic SSDs during an affordance-judgment task. Consistent with this hypothesis, DFA
yielded values indicative of self-similarity or 1/f scaling. A mixed-effects multiple linear
regression model reinforced the DFA results by indicating that 1/f scaling was stable across
participants regardless of trial order, aperture width, as well as affordance and confidence
judgments. Notably, the absence of a trial order effect (i.e., learning effects) suggests that
participants readily incorporate rod and Enactive Torch tools into the system used during
the perceptual judgment task. As discussed in previous research by the authors (Favela et
al., 2018), the absence of a trial order effect (i.e., learning effects) suggests that perceptual
systems (i.e., human participants) have the ability to flexibility achieve goals with their body
in various ways, which includes incorporating objects as functional components. If perceptual
systems are of such a highly adaptable kind, then it would suggest that human perceptual
systems are extended cognitive systems of the soft-assembled kind. Soft-assembled systems
are not hardwired or preprogrammed for limited ranges of particular outputs (Favela, 2019;
Favela et al., 2018; Thelen & Smith, 2006). Extended cognitive systems qua soft-assembled
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systems comprised parts that can temporarily coordinate in various ways to achieve
tasks.
Although 1/f scaling was generally stable across conditions, trials, task, and participant
features, multifractal analyses indicated that Enactive Torch movements exhibited a greater
spectral width than the rod movements. The findings suggest that the Enactive Torch facili-
tated a range of exploratory movements not observed with the rod. In particular, this effect
appears to be driven primarily by higher amplitude, or faster timescale, fluctuations in move-
ment. Thus, the Enactive Torch may promote a greater range of motion, especially in terms of
fine motor movements. Corroborating evidence is provided by the aRQA results that indicate
the Enactive Torch was associated with less repetitive motions or, put differently, more novel
positioning of the arm during tool use. The strength of the findings is further supported by
the presence of additional intuitive effects, for example, that higher amplitude movements
at slower scales occurred when participants made judgments of apertures with wider widths.
That is to say, wider aperture widths were associated with larger sweeping movements.
aRQA findings also indicate that movement dynamics with both SSDs exhibited a balance
between repetitive and novel movement patterns, with more coordinated, repetitive move-
ments associated with the rod. In addition to more novel fine motor movements evidenced
with MFDFA, this may have occurred as the rod is a type of tool people are more familiar
with, such that rod use produced more predictable patterns as opposed to more exploratory
patterns being produced with the more novel Enactive Torch. Additional research is needed to
determine whether the more novel patterns produced during Enactive Torch use would lessen
with experience. Overall, the precise reasons why the Enactive Torch provides a greater range
of motion than a rod is worth further investigation. It can be argued that because the Enac-
tive Torch is shorter in length than the rod (15.8 and 121.5 cm, respectively), it is easier
to wield. Yet the Enactive Torch weighs more than double of what the rod does (350 and
113.4 g, respectively), which would seem to—intuitively—result in a more limited range of
motion. The interplay of an object’s various properties, such as size and weight, and their
effect on their ability to be wielded intersects with issues of active and dynamic touch (e.g.,
Gibson, 1962; Michaels, Weier, & Harrison, 2007; Palatinus, Carello, & Turvey, 2011).
In the Introduction, we noted that with very few exceptions (e.g., Dotov et al., 2010) has
extended cognition been directly empirically investigated. The current analyses contribute
to the empirical case supporting the existence of extended cognition and provide an affir-
mative to the question, “Are person-plus-tool-systems extended cognitive systems?” To be
more precise, we have provided empirical support for the claim that person-plus-tool-systems
can exhibit extended cognitive dynamics; and in that way, they are cases of extended cogni-
tion. The affordance-judgment findings suggest that participants made perceptually equivalent
judgments across all three modalities: vision, rod, and Enactive Torch (Favela et al., 2018).
Thus, based on verbal reports, the two SSDs are functionally equivalent to vision when it
comes to the ability of participants to make judgments about the aperture pass-through-able
affordance. Based on analyses of arm movement dynamics presented above, both the rod and
Enactive Torch exhibited equivalent self-similar dynamics during the exploratory behaviors
that informed the judgments conveyed by verbal report. Though we did not record eye move-
ments during this study, the findings are consistent with research demonstrating self-similar
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movements during visual-search tasks (e.g., Aks et al., 2002; Stephen & Anastas, 2011). Thus,
we find functionally equivalent judgments and movement dynamics when using vision and
SSDs (in the absence of vision) during perceptual judgment tasks.6
5.1. Limitations and future directions
The current work has a number of strengths with regard to previous research that has
engaged with the topic of extended cognition. First, our hypothesis was directly about
extended cognition. This differs from other literature that aimed to support extended cogni-
tion by appeal to research that could be interpreted as being about extended cognition but was
not originally about that topic (for review see Wagman & Chemero, 2014). Second, this work
can be supported by a variety of strong theoretical foundations, including, but not limited
to, ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979/1986), enactivism (Thompson, 2007), and radical
embodied cognitive science (Chemero, 2009). Third, and most importantly for our current
aims, we provide a way to empirically assess extended cognition, which is an advancement
on the typical tools for assessing it that have been limited to intuitions and thought experi-
ments (cf. Adams & Aizawa, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998). These strengths pave the way
for additional experimental work on other forms of extended cognition (e.g., memory; e.g.,
Sutton, Harris, Keil, & Barnier, 2010) and broader forms of cognition as well (e.g., team
cognition; e.g., Fiore & Wiltshire, 2016). That said, we are aware of a number of limitations
of the current work. We discuss the limitations in relation to future research directions they
motivate.
The first limitation—and perhaps a paradoxical one—of the current work is its novelty.
That there are very few direct empirical assessments of extended cognition (e.g., Dotov
et al., 2010), so too is it the case that none—as far as we know—have been replicated. Conse-
quently, the empirical literature on extended cognition will remain suspect until replications
of findings become more commonplace. Second, though we have claimed that the findings of
our analyses of arm movement data are consistent with other studies of eye movement, the
conditions of those studies were not the same as ours, namely, they did not involve affordance
judgments (Aks et al., 2002; Stephen & Anastas, 2011). In view of that, findings from future
research on extended cognition will be strengthened when multiple perceptual modalities and
various cognitive extensions are assessed within the same experimental paradigm. Third, pre-
vious experimental work (e.g., Dotov et al., 2010) highlights the usefulness of perturbations
in this type of research, for example, manipulating features of SSD, such as altering feed-
back from the Enactive Torch or adding weight to the rod. Fourth, although we did not find
trial order effects on task performance, there are a number of worthwhile issues to explore
concerning learning effects and other performance differences among various SSDs. There
are clear differences between a rod (or cane) and the Enactive Torch, such as their physical
dimensions, how they convey information about the environment via various effectors, and
how perceptual calibration is structured by those effectors. Thus, additional research aimed at
elucidating tool differences could elucidate their contributions to person-plus-tool systems.7
The fifth—and perhaps most substantial—limitation concerns the ability to arbitrate which
theoretical approach best accounts for the data.
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Theories and explanations in line with the received view in cognitive science state that
perceptual judgments of the kind in the current work are explained by computations and rep-
resentations that occur in the brain (e.g., Edelman, 1999; Stone, 2012). A common example
of this approach is to understand tool-use as involving representations of the tool becoming
included in the brain’s body schema, for example, as the left hand is represented in the pri-
mary somatosensory cortex, so too can a tool become represented (e.g., Jovanov, Clifton,
Mazalek, Nitsche, & Welsh, 2015; Maravita & Iriki, 2004; Massen, 2013; Miller et al.,
2019). Such computational-representational-brain-based approaches to explaining tool-use
can include dynamics as key features of the explanations as well (e.g., Kuniyoshi & Sangawa,
2006; Kuniyoshi & Suzuki, 2004). On the one hand, such “neural-body schema” approaches
could be consistent with claims about extended cognition. For example, although a tool is
represented in the somatosensory cortex, it could be the case that the computation includes
features that extend beyond the brain, such as using an abacus to do arithmetic (Fischer &
Brugger, 2011). On the other hand, such “neural-body schema” approaches are commonly
viewed as antithetical to extended cognition. This is the case because extended cognition is
usually grouped with other theories that typically adhere to anticomputational and antirepre-
sentational conceptions of cognition and that emphasize the roles of the body and environ-
ment, namely, “4E cognition”; that is, cognition as embodied, embedded, extended, and/or
enactive (Newen, de Bruin, & Gallagher, 2018). The current work does not purport to set-
tle any debates concerning the nature of cognition, action, or perception. We leave it to the
reader to decide if the current findings support a computational-representational-brain-based
approach and are thus empirical evidence for the received view, or if it supports noncompu-
tational, nonrepresentational, and/or nonbrain-based views more akin to 4E cognition.
6. Conclusion
The current work lends support to extended cognition by demonstrating that the dynam-
ics involved in affordance judgments can extend through the body and tools as perceptual
judgments are made regarding action capabilities in an environment. Self-similar dynamics
indicative of a healthy and adaptive single system are robustly present when using SSDs such
as the rod and Enactive Torch, across both tools and regardless of aperture width, trial order,
participant characteristics, or participant judgments. Moreover, the dynamics of tool use can
elucidate nuances of tool use, for example, its association with different types of exploratory
movements that may prove to be functional in different task environments. In summary,
we provide an empirical framework whereby self-similar dynamics can be appealed to as
tests of extensions of cognitive dynamics. In doing so, we demonstrate that person-plus-tool-
systems—in this case, SSD during affordance judgment tasks—can be appropriately charac-
terized as extended cognitive systems.
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Notes
1 In contemporary analytic philosophy, there has been increased discussion as to whether
there is a substantive distinction between questions of fact and questions of language
(e.g., Chalmers, 2011; cf. Tollefsen & Dale, 2018, p. 276). Put more crudely, does the
answer to a question depend on facts about the world or merely on the ways certain words
are being used? We mention “verbal disputes” here to emphasize that our current aim is
not to argue if the phenomenon we are investigating is really extended cognition or if it
is actually embodied cognition, distributed cognition, and so forth. We are committed to
our focus being extended cognition; though it could overlap with embodiment, and so
forth.
2 We thank a reviewer for drawing our attention to other examples from the literature that
they suggest are empirical studies of extended cognition (e.g., Auvray, Lenay, & Stewart,
2009; Richardson, Marsh, & Baron, 2007). It is worth reiterating that we do not claim
that no empirical studies have ever been conducted on extended cognition. We do claim,
however, that such research is scarce, is typically not about “extended cognition” per
se but is readily interpretable as being about extended cognition post hoc (e.g., Auvray
et al., 2009), and can be more properly understood as not being about extended cognition
but other forms of cognition, such as distributed cognition (e.g., Richardson et al., 2007;
cf. Amon & Favela, 2019, which describes empirically measurable differences between
extended and distributed forms of cognition).
3 Note that we utilize the term “SSDs” broadly to include simple tools with no moving
parts—such as canes—and more mechanical instruments—such as Bach-y-Rita et al.’s
tactile-vision sensory substitution system (Bach-y-Rita, Collins, Saunders, White, &
Scadden, 1969). We could make a distinction and refer to the rod used in the current
research as a “tool” and the Enactive Torch as a “device.” Moreover, we acknowl-
edge there is controversy concerning when to categorize something (e.g., Braille, canes,
cochlear implants, etc.) as “sensory substitution” as opposed to, for example, sensory
augmentation, sensory replacement, and so forth (e.g., Auvray & Myin, 2009; Maiden-
baum, Abboud, & Amedi, 2014; Wright & Ward, 2019). Though meaningful issues, we
do not address them in the current work and aim for a broad and uncontroversial use of
“SSD.”
4 Consistent with the notion that p-values and effect sizes should be interpreted as a con-
tinuous variable, our interpretations of confidence in rejecting the null hypothesis also lie
along a continuum (e.g., Andrade, 2019). Thus, we opt to acknowledge marginal effects
in our results.
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5 As reported in the summary statistics section, the average H minima are calculated based
on the average H minima of each participant, such that the Enactive Torch condition
exhibits a lower H minima, compared to the rod condition. Similarly, because the mixed-
effects models calculate effects by taking into account the slopes of individual partici-
pants, versus pooling all of the trials, the findings indicate that the Enactive Torch condi-
tion has lower H minima. However, averaged across individual trials (versus each individ-
ual participant), the direction of the Enactive Torch condition exhibited a higher average
H minima, compared to the rod condition. We note this discrepancy for researchers who
perform follow-up analyses with our publicly available dataset.
6 We thank a reviewer for suggesting we make clear the connections that our claim of
“functional equivalency” has with other concepts in the relevant literature. For example,
defining extended cognition in terms of functional equivalency is comparable with the
“parity principle” argument for extended mind (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). In short, the
parity principle states that if an object outside the body (e.g., iPhone) plays the same
functional role as processes in the brain do (e.g., hippocampal neurons), then those
external objects should count as cognitive. Another concept, “complementarity,” has also
been appealed to in the extended cognition literature (Sprevak, 2019). With complemen-
tarity, an object does not have to be functionally similar to a biological process but can
become an extended part of the cognitive system when it is tightly integrated somewhere
in the brain-body-environment system.
7 We thank a reviewer for suggesting this specific line of future research.
References
Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2008). The bounds of cognition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
Aks, D. J., Zelinsky, G. J., & Sprott, J. C. (2002). Memory across eye-movements: 1/f dynamic in visual search.
Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences, 6, 1–25.
Amazeen, P. G. (2018). From physics to social interactions: Scientific unification via dynamics. Cognitive Systems
Research, 52, 640–657.
Amon, M. J., & Favela, L. H. (2019). Distributed cognition criteria: Defined, operationalized, and applied to
human-dog systems. Behavioural Processes, 162, 167–176. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beproc.2019.03.001
Amon, M. J., Pavlov, O. C., & Holden, J. G. (2018). Synchronization and fractal scaling as foundations for cogni-
tive control. Cognitive Systems Research, 50, 155–179. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2018.04.010
Amon, M. J., Vrzakova, H., & D’Mello, S. K. (2019). Beyond dyadic synchrony: Multimodal behavioral irregu-
larity predicts quality of triadic problem solving. Cognitive Science, 43, (10), e12787. https://doi.org/10.1111/
cogs.12787
Andrade, C. (2019). The p value and statistical significance: Misunderstandings, explanations, challenges,
and alternatives. Indian Journal of Psychological Medicine, 41, 210–215. https://doi.org/10.4103/IJPSYM.
IJPSYM_193_19
Auvray, M., Lenay, C., & Stewart, J. (2009). Perceptual interactions in a minimalist virtual environment. New
Ideas in Psychology, 271, 32–47.
Auvray, M., & Myin, E. (2009). Perception with compensatory devices: From sensory substitution to sensorimotor
extension. Cognitive Science, 336, 1036–1058.
Bach-y-Rita, P., Collins, C. C., Saunders, F. A., White, B., & Scadden, L. (1969). Vision substitution by tactile
image projection. Nature, 221, 963–964. https://doi.org/10.1038/221963a0
Beggs, J. M. (2019). The critically tuned cortex. Neuron, 1044, 623–624.
L. H. Favela et al. / Cognitive Science 45 (2021) 23 of 27
Bossomaier, T. R. J., & Green, D. G. (2007). Complex systems. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Burton, G. (1992). Nonvisual judgment of the crossability of path gaps. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Human Perception and Performance, 183, 698–713.
Cannon, M. J., Percival, D. B., Caccia, D. C., Raymond, G. M., & Bassingthwaighte, J. B. (1997). Evaluating
scaled windowed variance methods for estimating the Hurst coefficient of time series. Physica A: Statistical
Mechanics and its Applications, 241(3-4), 606–626.
Chalmers, D. J. (2011). Verbal disputes. Philosophical Review, 1204, 515–566. https://doi.org/10.1215/
00318108-1334478
Chemero, A. (2009). Radical embodied cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Clark, A. (2008). Supersizing the mind: Embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford, England: Oxford
University Press.
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58, 7–19.
Coco, M. I., & Dale, R. (2014). Cross-recurrence quantification analysis of categorical and continuous time series:
An R package. Frontiers in Psychology: Quantitative Psychology and Measurement, 5, 510. https://doi.org/10.
3389/fpsyg.2014.00510
Davis, T. J., Brooks, T. R., & Dixon, J. A. (2016). Multi-scale interactions in interpersonal coordination. Journal
of Sport and Health Science, 51, 25–34.
de Paz, C., Travieso, D., Ibáñez-Gijón, J., Bravo, M., Lobo, L., & Jacobs, D. M. (2019). Sensory substitution: The
affordance of passability, body-scaled perception, and exploratory movements. PLoS ONE, 14, (3), e0213342.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213342
Delignieres, D., Ramdani, S., Lemoine, L., Torre, K., Fortes, M., & Ninot, G. (2006). Fractal analyses for ‘short’
time series: A re-assessment of classical methods. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 506, 525–544.
Di Ieva, A. (Ed.). (2016). The fractal geometry of the brain. New York: Springer Science+Business Media.
Dotov, D. G., Nie, L., & Chemero, A. (2010). A demonstration of the transition from ready-to-hand to unready-
to-hand. PLoS ONE, 5(3), e9433. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0009433
Edelman, S. (1999). Representation and recognition in vision. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Eke, A., Herman, P., Kocsis, L., & Kozak, L. R. (2002). Fractal characterization of complexity in temporal physi-
ological signals. Physiological Measurement, 231, R1–R38.
Favela, L. H. (2019). Soft-assembled human–machine perceptual systems. Adaptive Behavior, 27(6), 423–437.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1059712319847129
Favela, L. H. (2020). Cognitive science as complexity science. WIREs Cognitive Science, 11(4), e1525. https:
//doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1525
Favela, L. H., & Chemero, A. (2016). The animal-environment system. In Y. Coello & M. H. Fischer (Eds.)
Perceptual and emotional embodiment: Foundations of embodied cognition (pp. 59–74). New York, NY: Rout-
ledge.
Favela, L. H., Coey, C. A., Griff, E. R., & Richardson, M. J. (2016). Fractal analysis reveals subclasses of neurons
and suggests an explanation of their spontaneous activity. Neuroscience Letters, 626, 54–58. https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.neulet.2016.05.017
Favela, L. H., Riley, M. A., Shockley, K., & Chemero A. (2018). Perceptually equivalent judgments made visually
and via haptic sensory-substitution devices. Ecological Psychology, 30(4), 326–345. https://doi.org/10.1080/
10407413.2018.1473712
Fiore, S. M., & Wiltshire, T. J. (2016). Technology as teammate: Examining the role of external cognition in
support of team cognitive processes. Frontiers in Psychology: Cognitive Science, 71531, 1–17. https://doi.org/
10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01531
Fischer, M. H., & Brugger, P. (2011). When digits help digits: Spatial-numerical associations point to finger
counting as prime example of embodied cognition. Frontiers in Psychology: Cognition, 2, 260. https://doi.org/
10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00260
Froese, T., McGann, M., Bigge, W., Spiers, A., & Seth, A. (2012). The Enactive Torch: A new tool for the science
of perception. IEEE Transactions on Haptics, 5, 365–375.
24 of 27 L. H. Favela et al. / Cognitive Science 45 (2021)
Froese, T., & Spiers, A. (2007). Toward a phenomenological pragmatics of enactive perception. Enactive/07:
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on enactive interfaces, Grenoble, France. (pp 105–108).
Gallos, L. K., Song, C., & Makse, H. A. (2007). A review of fractality and self-similarity in complex networks.
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 3862, 686–691.
Gibson, J. J. (1962). Observations on active touch. Psychological Review, 696, 477–491.
Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. (Original work
published 1986).
Gilden, D. L. (2001). Cognitive emissions of 1/f noise. Psychological Review, 1081, 33–56.
Gilden, D. L., Thornton, T., & Mallon, M. W. (1995). 1/f noise in human cognition. Science, 267, 1837–1839.
Goldberger, A. L., Amaral, L. A., Hausdorff, J. M., Ivanov, P. C., Peng, C. K., & Stanley, H. E. (2002). Fractal
dynamics in physiology: Alterations with disease and aging. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
99(suppl. 1), 2466–2472.
Hajnal, A., Clark, J. D., Doyon, J. K., & Kelty-Stephen, D. G. (2018). Fractality of body movements predicts
perception of affordances: Evidence from stand-on-ability judgments about slopes. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 446, 836–841.
Hausdorff, J. M., Peng, C. -K., Ladin, Z., Wei, J. Y., & Goldberger, A. L. (1995). Is walking a random walk?
Evidence for long-range correlations in stride interval of human gait. Journal of Applied Physiology, 78, 349–
358.
Holden, J. G. (2005). Gauging the fractal dimension of response times from cognitive tasks. In M. A. Riley & G.
C. Van Orden (Eds.), Tutorials in contemporary nonlinear methods for the behavioral sciences (pp. 267–318).
Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation. Retrieved from https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2005/nsf05057/nmbs/
nmbs.pdf
Holden, J. G., Van Orden, G. C., & Turvey, M. T. (2009). Dispersion of response times reveals cognitive dynamics.
Psychological Review, 116, 318–342.
Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the wild. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Ihlen, E. A. F. (2012). Introduction to multifractal detrended fluctuation analysis in Matlab. Frontiers in Physiol-
ogy: Fractal and Network Physiology, 3, 141. https://doi.org/10.3389/fphys.2012.00141
Ivanov, P. C., Amaral, L. A. N., Goldberger, A. L., Havlin, S., Rosenblum, M. G., Struzik, Z., & Stanley, H.
(1999). Multifractality in human heartbeat dynamics. Nature, 399, 461–465.
Jovanov, K., Clifton, P., Mazalek, A., Nitsche, M., & Welsh, T. N. (2015). The limb-specific embodiment of a tool
following experience. Experimental Brain Research, 2339, 2685–2694.
Kello, C. T., Beltz, B. C., Holden, J. G., & Van Orden, G. C. (2007). The emergent coordination of cognitive
function. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 1364, 551–568.
King, C. C. (1991). Fractal and chaotic dynamics in nervous systems. Progress in Neurobiology, 364, 279–308.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0301-0082(91)90003-J
Kuniyoshi, Y., & Sangawa, S. (2006). Early motor development from partially ordered neural-body dynamics:
Experiments with a cortico-spinal-musculo-skeletal model. Biological Cybernetics, 956, 589–605.
Kuniyoshi, Y., & Suzuki, S. (2004). Dynamic emergence and adaptation of behavior through embodiment as
coupled chaotic field. Proceedings of 2004 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robot Systems,
2, 2042–2049.
Maidenbaum, S., Abboud, S., & Amedi, A. (2014). Sensory substitution: Closing the gap between basic research
and widespread practical visual rehabilitation. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 41, 3–15.
Makowiec, D., Rynkiewicz, A., Wdowczyk-Szulc, J., Żarczyńska-Buchowiecka, M., Gałąska, R., & Kryszewski,
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